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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LARRY CLEGHORN,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

v.

)

Case No. 16329
DR. SCHOW, DR. WILFERT,
T. KENNETH ORTON, BOYD G.
HOLBROOK, THOMAS D. NOONAN,
JOHN DOE and ST. MARK'S
HOSPITAL,

)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, T. KENNETH ORTON
Appeal From A Judgment Of The Third Judicial District Court
In And For Salt Lake County, Utah
Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge, Presiding

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-appellant
alleging medical malpractice on the part of defendant-respondent
T. Kenneth Orton, among others.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable G.
Hal Taylor, Judge, granted the Motion for Judgment brought by
respondent Orton.
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Orton seeks an affirmance of the Judgment
dated December 20, 1978 granting his Motion for Judgment of
Dismissal and ordering that appellant's Complaint be dismissed
as to respondent Orton with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was injured in an automobile accident on
January 25, l976,as a result of which he was taken to St. Mark's
Hospital in Salt Lake City on the same day.
and then released.

He was treated

He returned to the hospital the next day

complaining of pain at which time X-rays were taken, including
X-rays of his cervical spine.

The X-rays of the spine were

interpreted by Dr. Orton on January 26, 1976.

Appellant was

admitted to the hospital for treatment oftther injuries.

Be-

cause of persisting neck pain another set of cervical spine
X-rays was taken on January 31, 1976.

These films were inter-

preted as showing a vertebral body displacement at the C-6,
C-7 interspace and a fracture at the C-7 articular pillar.
Subsequently, surgery was performed on appellant's cervical
spine on February 3, 1976.

Immediately following the surgery

appellant experienced paralysis of his lower extremities.
Other manifestations of a spinal cord lesion manifested themselves thereafter.
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On January 24, 1978 the Complaint in the case at bar
was filed.

On January 27, 1978 a Notice of Intent to Commence

Action was served on Dr. Orton accompanied by a summons and
copy of the Complaint filed January 24.
On March 21, 1978 respondent Orton filed his Answer.
On August 22, 1978 respondent Orton filed an Amended Answer
pursuant to a Consent executed by Richard W. Giauque as attarney for appellant Larry Cleghorn on August 14, 1978.
On November 13, 1978 respondent Orton filed a Motion
for Judgment pursuant to Rules 12 and 56(b), U.R.C.P.

Hearing

was had on said Motion on December 18, 1978 at which hearing
the lower court granted the Motion.

This appeal followed.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT
IN GRANTING RESPONDENT ORTON'S
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
The lower court correctly applied Sections 78-14-8
and 78-14-4 of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act in granting
respondent Orton's Motion for Judgment.

Appellant Cleghorn

discoverd his injury no later than February 3, 1976.
filed a Complaint on or about January 24, 1978.

Appellant

On January

27, 1978 Dr. Orton was served with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action along with a summons and a copy of the Complaint
filed on January 24.
-3-
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The lower court ruled that since the filing of the
Complaint on January 24 was not preceded by the service of
a Notice of Intent to Commence Action, the lawsuit against
respondent and the other named defendants was not commenced
according to the requirements of the Malpractice Act, and
hence the statute of limitations applicable to this action
continued to run.

The statute of limitations ran out, appel-

lant's cause of action was barred before his suit was properly
commenced, and therefore respondent's Motion for Judgment was
granted.
Appellant now asks this Court to reconsider its
decision in Vealy v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (1978), and overrule
it.

Appellant argues that Vealy should be overruled because

it is based on a misinterpretation of the Malpractice Act.
Respondent Orton respectfully submits that Vealy was properly
decided and should stand.
Appellant is convinced that this Court improperly
applied Section 78-14-8 of the Malpractice Act retroactively
to causes of action which arose prior to April 1, 1976 but
which were sued upon after that date.

In so arguing, appellant

ignores the clearly expressed intention of the Utah Legislature
as well as familiar and widely applied rules of judicial construction of statutes.
Section 78-14-11 of the Malpractice Act provides:
Act not retroactive - Exception. -The
provisions of this act, with the exception
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-4Machine-generated OCR,
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of the provisions relating to the limitation
on the time for commencing an action, shall
not apply to injuries, death or services
rendered which occurred prior to the effective date of this act. (Emphasis added)
Even a cursory examination of Section 78-14-8
shows that said Section is so intimately connected with
the statute of limitations as found in Section 78-14-4 that
those two sections must be construed together.
Section 78-14-4 provides in pertinent part:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs.
(emphasis added)
Section 78-14-8 provides in part:
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be commenced unless and until
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least
ninety days' prior notice of intent to commence an action .

* * *
Such notice shall be served within the
time allowed for commencing a malpractice
action against a health care provider. If
the notice is served less than ninety days
prior to the expiration of the applicable
time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care
provider shall be extended to ninety days
from the date of service of notice. (Emphasis added)
This Court recognized in the Vealy decision that
the two sections quoted above must be construed together.
-5-
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Furthermore, the use of the word

11

provisions" in Section 78-14-ll

shows that the Legislature intended Section 78-14-8 as well as
Section 78-14-4 to be applied to actions commenced after the
effective date of the Malpractice Act.

This intent is fur-

ther emphasized by the fact that Section 78-14-4 itself provides that the section is to be applied retroactively.

Subsec-

tion (2) thereof states:
The provisions of this section shall apply
to all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability and shall apply retroactivela
to all persons, partnerships, associations an
corporations and to all health care providers
and to all malpractice actions against health
care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective
date of this act . . . . (Emphasis added)
If Section 78-14-11 intended that only 78-14-4 was
to be applied retroactively then Section 78-14-11 would thereby
by rendered superfluous and redundant.

As is stated in 73 ArnJur

Statutes, Section 250:
In the interpretation of a statute, the legislature will be presumed to have inserted every
part thereof for a purpose. Thus, it should not
be presumed that any provision of a statute is
redundant. A statute should not be construed in
such manner as to render it partly ineffective
or inefficient if another construction will make
it effective. Indeed, it is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that significance and
effect should, if possible, without destroying
the sense or effect of the law, be accorded
every part of the act, including every section,
paragraph, sentence or clause, phrase, and word.
(Footnotes omitted)
This Court was following these rules when it
stated in Horman v. Liguor Control Commission, 21 Utah 2d
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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!

The difficulty with the plaintiff's
position is that it fails to give effect
to the exceptions provided for in the language at the end of said Sec. 27 as emphasized above. This runs counter to a foundational rule of statuto"ry construction which
requires us to assume that all of the words
in a statute were used advisedly and that
an application of the statute is favored
which will give effect to all of its provisions. (Footnote omitted)
Accord, Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485
P.2d 1035 (1972); Totorica v. Thomas,

16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d

984 (1965); Metropolitan Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt
Lake City,

14 Utah 2d 171, 380 P.2d 721 (1963); Peay v. Board

of Ed. of Provo County School Dist., 14 Utah 2d 63, 377 P.2d
490 (1962).
Coupled with the legislative intent shown above that
Section 78-14-8 was to be applied retrospectively, is the general
rule of statutory construction that a statute merely affecting
a remedy or law of procedure applies to actions begun after
it becomes effective, whether the cause of action arose before
or after the effective date.

See, e.g., 82 C.J.S., Statutes,

Sections 417 and 421; 73 AmJur 2d, Statutes, Section 354;
Bodine v. Department of Labor & Industries, 190 P.2d 89
(Wash. 1948); Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 40 (D.
Idaho 1955)
This Court has followed the rule stated above in
the cases of Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P.ll7 (1909),
and Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948).

-7-
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The Court in Boucofski, stated:
While it is true that a party's rights in
a judgment, as a general rule, may not be
affected by legislative acts passed or
which become effective after the entry of
a judgment, the rule does not apply to
laws which are merely remedial, and which
only affect matters of procedure or practice. (104 P. at 117)
In Petty, the Court stated:
. . . where a statute remedial in nature is
amended providing a different remedy, all
actions pending will be governed by the new
statutory provisions. (192 P.Zd at 593)
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the
lower court correctly applied the law as found in the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act and Vealy v. Clegg.

It is further

submitted that Vealy was properly decided and there is no sound
reason to now overrule it.

Therefore the judgment of the lower

court should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT
CANNOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY;
TO DO SO WOULD DEPRIVE RESPONDENT
AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED OF A
DEFENSE WHICH WAS GOOD WHEN THE
AMENDMENT WAS PASSED, IN DEROGATION OF RESPONDENT'S RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant Cleghorn argues that application of the
1979 Amendment to the Malpractice Act to the case at bar would
not be violative of either the Utah or the United States Constitutions because to do so would not impair any vested or
fundamental right.

Appellant cites the case of Chase Securities

Corporation v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed.
1628 (1945) in support of this proposition.
Citing the case of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S.620,
6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483, the Supreme Court in Donaldson
stated:
Where lapse of time has not invested a party
with title to real or personal property, a
state legislature, consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment may repeal or extend a
statute of limitations, even after right of
action is barred thereby, restore the plaintiff his remedy, and divest the defendant
of the statutory bar. (325 U.S. at 311-12)
While the Supreme Court declined to overrule Campbell
in Donaldson, the Court stated:
We are reminded that some state courts have
not followed it L-Campbell7 in construing
provisions of their constitutions similar
to the due process clause. Many have, as
they are privileged to do, so interpreted
their own easily amendable constitutions
to give restrictive clauses a more rigid interpretation than we properly could impose upon
them from without by construction of the Federal instrument which is amendable only with
great difficulty and with the cooperation of
many States. (Citing, inter alia, In re
Swan, 95 Utah 408, 79 P.2d 999 (193~
TITS U.S. at 312-13, including n.' 9 at 312)

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Since handing down the decision in the case of Ireland
v. MacKintosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 P.901 (1900), the Utah Supreme
Court has declined to follow the holding and rationale in
Campbell.

At Page 904 of Ireland, this Court held:
We are clearly of the opinion . . .
that, when appellant's right of action on
the note in question became barred under
the previous statute, the respondent acquired
a vested right, in this state, to plead that
statute as a defense and bar to the action.

The result of the holding in Ireland was to forbid retrospective
application of an amendment to the statute of limitations of
Utah extending the period of limitations for suing on a written
obligation from four years to six years.
Ireland was followed in In re Swan's Estate, which
was cited by the United States Supreme Court in Donaldson.
Ireland was subsequently cited with approval by the
Utah Supreme Court as late as 1975 in the case of Greenhalgh
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799.

In Footnote 14 at Page 802, Mr.

Justice Crockett writing for the Court stated:
Here we note the cause of action against
defendant Payson City accrued in Jan. 1970
and was barred after Jan. 1971, thus the 1973
amendment to Sec. 10-7-77, U.C.A. 1953 (Supp.
1973), which provides: ". . . If the person
for whom the claim is made is a minor, then
the claims covered by this section may be so
presented within the time limit specified
above or within one year after the person
reaches the age of majority, whichever is
longer," is not applicable in this case because as was held in Ireland v. MacKintosh,
22 Utah 296, 61 P.901, "The subsequent passage
-10-
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of an act by the legislature increasing the
period of limitation could not operate to
affect or renew a cause of action already
barred." . . . .
Mr. Justice Crockett, again writing for this Court,
in the case of State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1977),
stated:
. . . the law should not be changed simply
because the will or desire of judges as to
what the law is or ought to be. Much less
so, should it be so changed during the course
of a particular proceeding to have a retroactive affect thereon. Notwithstanding the
fact that the change the state advocates
would vindicate the position taken in the
dissent referred to, to so rule in this
case retroactively would violate what we
regard as a higher principle: that of
honoring the established law. If there is
to be such a change in the law, whether b¥
legislative act or by judicial decision, 1t
seems that it should have only prospective
affect and that fairness and good conscience
require that it should not be applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they
existed at the time a particular controversy
arose. (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis added)
Of particular force with respect to the case at bar
is the 1978 case of Del Monte Corporation v. Moore, 580 P.2d
224.

Citing Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson, supra,

Mr. Justice Crockett stated:
The general and well established principle
of law is that statutes prescribing limitations relate to remedies; and that the legislature has power to increase the time in
which an action may be brought. In that
connection it should be observed that if the

-11-
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statute has run on a cause of action, so
that it is dead, itmnnot be revived b~
any such statutory extension. (580 P. d
at 225) (emphasis added)
It is therefore clear that while appellant may be
correct in characterizing statutes of limitations as relating
to remedies rather than substantive law, it is likewise clear
that the rule has long been and remains in Utah that if a defense based on the statute of limitations is available and
invoked by a defendant, such defense becomes a vested right
of which the defendant cannot be deprived without due process
of law.

Retrospective application of the 1979 Amendment to

the Malpractice Act would act to divest respondent of his defense of statute of limitations which was good at the time the
Amendment was passed.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Utah
State Legislature could not impair respondent's statute of
limitations defense by legislative enactment, and if this
Court finds that it was the legislature's intention to so do,
then the Amendment must be declared unconstitutional as violative of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.

If

the constitutionality of the Amendment is to be preserved, the
Amendment must be construed as having prospective application
only.
POINT III
RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 1979
AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH HEALTH CARE
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MALPRACTICE ACT WOULD RENDER
SAID AMENDMENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF UTAH.
Article VI, Section 26 prohibits the legislature
from enacting special laws in particular cases and states:
No private or special law shall be enacted
where a general law can be applicable.
The definition of "special laws" is found in Mr. Justice
Maughan's opinion for this Court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Company v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association, 564 P.2d 751,
754 (1977):
In State v. Kallas /97 Utah 492, 505, 94 P.2d
414 (19391/ this court set forth the general
definitions of general and special laws. A
general law applies to and operates uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places,
or things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in
question. On the other hand, special legislation relates either to particular persons, places,
or things or to persons, places, or things which,
though not particularized, are separated by any
method of selection from the whole class to which
the law might, but for such legislation, be
applied.
In People v. Western Fruit Growers /72 Cal.
2d 494, 140 P.Zd 13, 19-20 (19431/ the court
stated a law is general when it applies equally
to all persons embraced in a class founded upon
some natural, intrinsic, or constitutional distinction. It is special legislation if it confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar
disabilities, or burdensome conditions in the
exercise of a common right; upon a class of
persons arbitrarily selected, from the general
body of those who stand in precisely the same
relation to the subject of the law. (Emphasis
added)
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After analyzing the 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice
Act, appellant Cleghorn at Pages 15-16 of his brief makes the
following statement:
Cleghorn urges this Court to carefully
discern and analyze this legislative
intent . . . . Having done so, this Court
will surely conclude that the Legislature
intended to avoid the consequences which
it deemed unfair, and to insure that all
of the endin mal ractice actions in--w ic t e causes o action arose before
April 1! 1976, be spared the unconscienable
fate su fered by the plaintiff in Vealy.
(Emphasis added)
Counsel for Cleghorn elsewhere implies in his brief to this
Court that the legislature had the cases pending before this
Court which had issues relating to the Malpractice Act, in
mind when it passed the 1979 Amendment to the Act.

If this

is true and the Amendment applied retrospectively, then the
Amendment must be considered special legislation because it
relates either to particular persons,
places, or things or to persons, places,
or things which, though not particularized,
are separated by any method of selection
from the whole class to which the law
might, but for such legislation be applied.
(564 P.2d at 754)
If, on the other hand, the Amendment is construed
to be of prospective application only, then it is obviously
of general application and would not suffer the constitutional
infirmity it would suffer if given retrospective application.
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that this
Court should construe the 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice
Act as having prospective application only in order to save
the Amendment from unconstitutionality.
POINT IV
THE FINAL CLAUSE OF SECTION
78-14-8 AS AMENDED BY THE
LEGISLATURE IN 1979 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article VI, Section 22 provides in pertinent part:

***

Except general appropriations bills
and bills for the codification and general
revision of laws, no bill shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title. *
(This provision formerly found in Art. VI,
Sec. 23)

**

In State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 419
(1939), this Court stated the purpose of this constitutional
provision as follows:
The constitutional provision is for a
particular purpose and it is not a technical restriction on the legislature.
That practical purpose is to inform the
legislature and the public what legislation is proposed, and a title is sufficient
that will lead to an inquiry into the body
of the act to ascertain changes proposed
in the original and existing law.
The title of H.B. 164 reads as follows:
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 78-14-4 AND 78-14-8,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY
CHAPTER 23, LAWS OF UTAH 1976; RELATING TO
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE: PROVIDING THAT
THE LEGAL DISABILITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL SHALL
NOT ACT TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
SET FORTH IN THAT SECTION; PROVIDING THAT
NOTICES OF INTENT TO BRING MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
BE SIGNED BY THE PLAINTIFF OR HIS ATTORNEY;
PROVIDING THAT THE NOTICE MAY BE SERVED BY
CERTIFIED MAIL; AND EXTENDING THE TIME FOR
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTIONS WHERE THE NOTICE
IS SERVED LESS THAN 90 DAYS PRIOR TO THE
EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The final clause of H.B. 164 is an amendment to
Section 78-14-8 and reads as follows:
This section shall, for purposes of
determining its retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the limitation on the
time for commencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on
or after April 1, 1976. This section shall
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care
provider.
It is clear that the title of H.B. 164 makes no
reference to this clause.

While it is true that the title of

an amendment is constitutionally proper if it refers to the
section to be amended (see, e.g. Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13,

95 P. 367 (1908)), it does not follow that when the legislature
chooses to be specific in setting out those portions of a
statute which are to be amended, the failure to specify an
entire amendatory cause does not run afoul of the purpose of
Article VI, Section 22.

A legislator or a member of the pub-

lic who read the title to the 1979 Amendment

ID

the Malpractice

Act was not led "to an inquiry into the body of the act to
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ascertain changes proposed in the original and existing law,"
simply because of the specificity of the legislature in listing
the other portions of the Act that were to be amended.
cially in the case

Espe-

of legislators who were working under the

burden of a mountain of legislative proposals, the failure to
mention the final clause in the title of the Amendment amounts
almost to a deception and certainly renders the final clause
unconstitutional as violative of Article VI, Section 22.
The fact that the final clause of the Amendment is
constitutionally infirm does not imply that the entire
Amendment be declared unconstitutional.

As was pointed out

by this Court in Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51
P.2d 645, 650 (1935):
However, a failure of a legislative enactment
to comply with [Art. VI, Sec. 2~ does not
render the act unconstitutional as to subject
matters which are clearly expressed in the
title of the act. The rule is thus stated in
1 Cooley's fonstitutional Limitations (8th Ed.)
p. 308: "/ . . . 7 If, by striking from the
act all that relates to the object not indicated
by the title, that which is left is complete in
itself, sensible, capable of being executed, and
wholly independent of that which is rejec~ed,
it must be sustained as constitutional. [ . . . _7"
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the final
clause of the H.B. 164 amendment of Section 78-14-8 is unconstitutional as violative of Article VI ,

Section 22 of the

Constitution of Utah and so should be stricken from the Amendment.
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POINT V
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE UTAH HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT CANNOT BE
APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY SO AS TO
VALIDATE A PROCEEDING UNAUTHORIZED
BY THE ORIGINAL ACT.
As the analysis under Point I above has shown, the
appellant's original malpractice action against this respondent was never commenced because of failure to comply with the
requirements of the Malpractice Act.

It would be anomalous if

a subsequent amendment to that Act could be applied retrospectively to validate a proceeding which was unauthorized by the
Act itself.
This issue was squarely faced by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court in People v. Tax Commission,
26 N.Y.S. 2d 425 (1941).

In that case, the court was faced

with an amendment of the New York law relating to the requirement of a trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
At the time of the decision by the referee, he
was required by law to "state separately the facts found and
conclusions of law."

(26 N.Y.S. 2d at 428)

This he failed

to do, but prior to the appeal of the matter, the law was
changed to provide that:
the decision of the court may be oral or
in writing and. . . must state the facts
which it deems essential. (IbidJ
-18-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The referee had filed a written opinion, and the
respondent contended that the change in the statutory procedure
should be applied to the proceedings so that the opinion of
the referee would suffice to constitute a

''decisio~'

and hence

meet the requirements of the amended law.
The appellate Court stated:
It is unquestionably true that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect
pending actions and proceedings unless the
language of the act excludes them from its operation. However, something more than the application of that proposition is involved here. This
rule has been generally understood to refer
only to those pending actions in which the
procedureal step changed by the new law has
not yet been taken. The respondent contends,
howeverS that the rule is so extensive that
it m~ e used to validate a proceeding unauthor~zed by the prior statute.
Such a construction, we think, is contrary to the necessity for consistent practice and has no support
in authoritative decisions. Unless procedure
is to be involved in chaos it must be governed
by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises. Southwick v. Southwick, 49 N.Y. 510; Lazarus v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co., 145 N.Y. 581, 40 N.E. 240;
Matter of Reynolds, 202 N.Y. 430, 96 N.E. 87,
416. (Ibid.) (Emphasis added)
The New York case is directly in point here.

Under

the Malpractice Act as it was passed in 1976, a malpractice
action could not be legally commenced unless and until a Notice
of Intent to Commence Action was served on the prospective
defendants.

Therefore, the Complaint filed by appellant herein

did not serve to commence a malpractice action against this
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respondent; the attempted "action" was invalid from the beginning.

The 1979 Amendment to the Malpractice Act cannot now

be applied to validate that action.
POINT VI
APPELLANT CANNOT CLAIM THAT
RESPONDENT ORTON WAIVED ANY
DEFENSE BASED ON THE UTAH HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BECAUSE APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE FILING
OF RESPONDENT'S AMENDED ANSWER
IN WHICH SUCH A DEFENSE IS RAISED
On May 5, 1978, more than three months following the
filing of the Complaint in this case, counsel for appellant
wrote a letter to the various counsel for respondents in
which he stated:
You will recall that we dulz filed and
served the statutory (UCA /-Sec./78-14-8)
"Notice of Intent to Commence Action" upon
various defendants simultaneously with service upon them of the summons and complaint
in this action; in the answer of Dr. Wilfert
the defense was raised that the required notice was not given ninety days prior to commencement of the action; while I believe the defense
has no merit whatever, any problem can easily
be corrected by my re-serving that defendant or
any others that may seek to raise such a defense . . . . (R. 176-77)
In response to this letter, counsel for respondent
Orton wrote the letter of May 10, 1978, a copy of which is
attached as "Exhibit B" to appellant's brief.
On August 11, 1978, counsel for Dr. Orton wrote
the letter of August 11, 1978, a copy of which is attached

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

as Exhibit "D" to appellant's brief.

In that letter, respon-

dent's counsel stated:
Enclosed please find Motion for leave
to file an Amended Answer on behalf of
Dr. T. Kenneth Orton, and also the prorosed
Amended Answer which sets forth the de ense
of statute of limitations. I also enclose
original and two copies of a Consent that
Dr. T. Kenneth Orton file the enclosed
Amended Answer. If you are willing to sign
the Consent without the necessity of the
hearing on my Motion, please execute and
return to me the original and one copy thereof.
(Emphasis added)
On August 14, 1978, counsel for appellant sent a
letter to respondent Orton's counsel stating:
As you requested, enclosed please find
the original and one copy of the Consent
form allowing you to file your proposed
amended answer for ~e defendant T. Kenneth
Orton in this matter. (R. 210)
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides
in part that" . . . a party may amend his pleading
written consent of the adverse party.

. . by

"

Rule 15(c) is entitled "Relation Back of Amendments"
and provides:
Wherever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading.

Dr. Orton's original Answer was filed on or about
March 14, 1978.

By virtue of the provisions of Rule 15(c),
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the defense of failure to comply with the provisions of the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act contained in the Amended
Answer relates back to March 14, 1978.
Appellant argues that Rules 8(c) and 12(h) work to
bar this respondent from asserting his defenses under the
Malpractice Act.

The provisions of Rule lS(c) likewise an-

swer that argument.

Plaintiff's interpretation of Rules 8(c)

and 12(h) would render Rule 15 a nullity in that parties could
never effectively amend their pleadings.
Appellant makes much of his contention that he had
consented to the filing of an Amended Answer containing a
statute of limitations defense but not a defense asserting
non-compliance with the notice provisions of the Malpractice
Act.

There are two answers to this contention.

First, appel-

lant's counsel had before him a copy of the Amended Answer at
the time he executed the Consent to the filing of that Amended
Answer on behalf of his client.

Second, as demonstrated in

Vealy v. Clegg, a statute of limitations defense clearly may
include issues involving failure to serve a Notice of Intent
to Commence Action or a defect in said Notice.
It is respectfully submitted that appellant's argument that this respondent had waived any defense based on the
Malpractice Act is clearly without merit.

If, arguendo, de-

fendant had waived by failing to include his defense in the
original answer, plaintiff forgave said waiver by consenting
-22-
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to the filing of the Amended Answer which set forth the defense.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has argued that to apply the 1979 Amendment to the Utah Health' Care Malpractice Act would not impair
any vested rights.

Appellant does not take into account any

of the rights that vested and were relied upon as a result of
the Legislature's passage of the Malpractice Act in 1976.

The

Dictrict Court correctly interpreted the Act and this Court
sustained that interpretation in the well-reasoned and entirely
correct decision in Vealy v. Clegg.

Appellant ignores the cases

that may have been settled as a result of the passage of the
Malpractice Act and its interpretation in Vealy.
the parties in Vealy itself?

And what of

Appellant cannot seriously con-

tend that no rights vested or that no reliance was placed on
the Malpractice Act and its interpretation under Vealy.
The analysis in this brief has shown that, in Utah,
respondent has a vested right to his statute of limitations
defense, and further that this vested right is of the type
which is included in the due process protection of Article I,
Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah.

Respondent has also

shown that if the legislature intended retrospective application of the 1979 Amendment of the Malpractice Act, said Amendment would amount to special legislation which is forbidden by
Article VI, Section 26 of the Constitution of Utah.
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Furthermore,
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the final clause of amended Section 78-14-8 must be declared
unconstitutional because no mention of said clause is made
in the title of H.B. 164 as required by Article VI, Sectian22
of the Constitution of Utah.
Finally, the analysis under Point IV above shows
that counsel for appellant knowingly consented to the filing
of an Amended Answer by respondent Orton which Answer pleaded
a defense based on the statute of limitations.

Thus whether

respondent Orton may have earlier waived a defense based on
the statute of limitations is a moot question.
It is respectfully submitted that the Order of the
lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE, CHILD & RITCHIE

R.M. Child
Attorneys for Respondent Orton

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies of Brief of Defendant-Respondent T. Kenneth Orton,
first-class postage thereon prepaid, to Richard W. Giauque,
Richard W. Casey, Berman & Giauque, attorneys for plaintiffappellant, 500 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and
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to J. Anthony Eyre, Kipp and Christian, Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Dr. Wilfert, 600 Commercial Club Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 on this~ day of June, 1979.
~I

R. M. Child
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